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The light flickers and the sound deafens. On screen, 
a mighty battleship blows up. Even though the picture is 
grainy black and white, viewers still jump in their chairs, 
and they will continue to do so each time they see the USS 
Arizona explode. 
World War II documentaries have entered into American 
consciousness, and their influence is seen today. 
Originally, military and Hollywood filmmakers used these 
films as tools to persuade a formerly reluctant and 
isolated America to go to war. Now, teachers can use these 
documentaries as a means to instruct younger generations 
about the Second World War. These films are the genesis of 
such modern documentaries as Fahrenheit 9/11 (2004), Super 
Size Me (2004), Spellbound (2002), and Hoop Dreams (1994). 
Documentaries may also be viewed as predecessors to reality 
television. Documentaries, even those made during World 
War II, advance the concept of "reality as entertainment." 
So, how do these modern documentaries and reality 
television relate to 1940s non-fiction films of the Second 
World War? After all, documentaries, especially those that 
1 
depict historical events, have a popular reputation of 
accuracy. The clich~ of "the camera does not lie" received 
greater authority due to the 1940s depictions of war. 
However, documentaries are not necessarily truthful. 
Some are made for the express purpose of propaganda, as 
Michael Moore's movies have shown recently. Skilled 
directors of World War II films, such as John Ford, Frank 
Capra, and John Huston, edited their films to convey an 
idea or to show the audience only certain things. 
Therefore, even documentaries do not depict reality as it 
really is, but the filmmaker's vision of reality. 
Films that many people consider documentaries are 
actually propaganda films. There are many subtle 
differences between the two film genres. Documentaries are 
"the creative treatment of actuality." 1 Genuine 
documentaries feature real events and involve real footage; 
they incorporate almost no fictional elements. The 
filmmaker believes the material to be true and presents the 
material without any staged scenes. However, the filmmaker 
has an interpretation and a viewpoint of the footage. The 
documentary filmmaker's tries to convince an audience to 
consider and accept the viewpoint. Documentary films can 
1 Erik Barnouw, Documentary: A History of the Non-Fiction Film (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1974), 287. 
2 
also be pure propaganda. Propaganda films methodically 
utilize the ability to organize messages, not viewpoints, 
in an effort to influence large numbers of people. 2 
Filmmakers use fictional elements to support their 
messages. These films are designed to manipulate an 
audience's emotions and thoughts in order to sway the 
public into believing the presented message. They are 
usually politically motivated, and their goals are to move 
their audience towards certain political actions or 
opinion. 3 
Sources of propaganda during the Second World War 
include pamphlets, advertisements, cartoons, and movies, 
both feature films and documentaries. Because these items 
were able to reach so many American civilians, military 
advisors and politicians used propaganda films to influence 
political beliefs and commitment to the war effort. 
The history of the United States's military 
relationship with Hollywood filmmakers goes back to 1917 
and the Creel Committee on Public Information. 4 President 
Woodrow Wilson asked George Creel, a journalist, to head 
the committee, whose goal was to promote American 
2 James E. Combs and Sara T. Combs., Film Propaganda and American 
Politics: An Analysis and Filmography (New York: Garland Publishing, 
Inc. , 1994) , 6. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. 28. 
3 
involvement in the Great War. The committee attempted to 
"sell" the war to America by releasing propaganda to the 
public. 5 The message that Creel released to Americans 
sought to "maintain the official view as the dominant one, 
demonize the enemy . . uplift public morale . . and 
interpret in a favorable light all immediate war news." 6 In 
order to influence the public with this message, Creel 
enlisted the aid of Hollywood. Silent movie stars promoted 
war bonds, and studios released pro-war features and 
documentaries, such as Pershing's Crusaders (1918) . 7 
After World War I, the Committee on Public Information 
officially disbanded, and military documentaries became a 
memory. The war left many people disillusioned. During 
the 1920s and into the 1930s, the United States returned to 
a policy of non-involvement it had prior to participation 
in World War I. 
The Great Depression made Americans less interested 
in other nations' affairs, and they were not interested in 
the military documentaries of World War I. Although the 
Department of Agriculture released the few documentaries, 
such as The Plow That Broke the Plains (1936), the most 





comedies, such as Frank Capra's It Happened One Night 
(1932) or westerns, such as John Ford's Stagecoach (1939) 8 • 
In general, American documentaries ended after the 1920s. 
Although feature-length documentaries disappeared in 
the United States of the 1930s, newsreels took their place. 
These short newsreels, mostly seen before feature films in 
theaters, became the cliched eye on the world. They were 
also the beginning of the modern documentary. The shorts 
recorded events as they happened. Throughout the 1930s, 
these newsreels treated Americans to images of the Nazis 
rolling over Austria and Czechoslovakia and Japan invading 
Manchuria and China. However, most Americans considered 
themselves separate from the flickering images presented 
before them. The images of war did not involve America on 
a daily basis. 
Other nations led the field in documentaries and other 
forms of propaganda films. Germany became especially adept 
in propaganda films. Many film buffs and historians 
8 wJohn Ford (I): Director Filmography." Internet Movie Database. 
[movie list on-line]; available from 
http://www.imdb.com/name/~~0000406/; accessed 5 April 2005; ftFrank 
Capra." Internet Movie Database. [movie list on-line]; available from 
http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0001008/; accessed 5 April 2005. 
Note: Internet Movie Database is a large, detailed movie web site. It 
is useful for finding quick movie credits, since the vast majority of 
their information comes from onscreen credits, studio press releases, 
interviews, and official biographies of filmmakers. See winternet 
Movie Database Help." Internet Movie Database. [movie list on-line]; 
available from http://www.imdb.com/help/show leaf?infosource; accessed 
13 April 2005. 
5 
consider Leni Riefenstahl's classic propaganda films, 
Triumph of the Will (1934) and Olympiad (1937) to be among 
the finest documentaries ever made. 9 Although Riefenstahl's 
film Triumph of the Will does not use any fictional 
elements, it is overtly political. Triumph of the Will's 
opening five minutes tells almost everything viewers need 
to know about Riefenstahl's "beliefs." 10 Hitler's airplane 
is flying in the clouds, and by implication, Hitler, 
godlike, is descending from on high. To augment that 
messianic visual, Riefenstahl shows the shadow of the plane 
flying over the Nuremberg crowds who must look up to see 
their savior's arrival. Finally, she always shows Hitler 
above the crowds and larger-than-life. 11 Triumph of the 
Will deliberately gives the idea that Hitler is the savior 
of Depression-era Germany. His Third Reich and the 
National Socialist Party is going to be around for a long 
time. The people are supposed to unite under Hitler and 
the Nazi Party. 
9 "Triumph of the Will" [article on-line); available from 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Triumph of the Will; Internet; accessed 7 
February 2005; "Triumph of the Will (1934)" [list on-line]; available 
from htto://www.imdb.com/title/tt0025913/corobined; Internet; accessed 7 
February 2005. See also Barnouw, 101, 103. 
10 Although Leni Riefenstahl spent the rest of her life denying she was 
a Nazi (she died in 2003), her propaganda films proved to be invaluable 
to the Nazi cause. Triumph of the Will haunted her all her life. 
"Leni Riefenstahl" [biography on-line]; available from 
http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0726166/bio; Internet; accessed 12 February 
2005. Also see Barnouw, 103. 
11 Leni Riefenstahl, dir., Triumph of the Will. (Synapse, 1934), 
Digital Video Disc, 2001. 
6 
Most nations ignored this film, but it foreshadowed 
the events that would lead many nations to fight Germany a 
little over five years later. Almost every group that 
Hitler inspects is militaristic in nature-these groups 
involve uniforms and marching. Even the labor group 
presents their shovels as if the instruments were rifles. 
Five years later, Germany had conquered most of 
Europe, but the United States was slow in joining the war 
due to isolationist sentiments. However, once Japan 
attacked the American Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, the 
need to fight quickly replaced any isolationist feelings. 
America mobilized for a fight. One group that was "called 
up" was Hollywood filmmakers. Whereas a number of actors, 
such as Jimmy Stewart and Clark Gable, saw action during 
the war, the military hired directors and writers to make 
documentaries explaining why the United States was going to 
war. 12 
The Army and the Office of Strategic Services asked 
two prominent directors, John Ford and Frank Capra to head 
up film divisions in order to present the war to Americans 
and encourage them to fight or work. These directors took 
Riefenstahl's cue of politicizing their documentaries. In 
12 Thomas Doherty, Projections of War: Hollywood, American Culture, and 
World War II (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 24, 27, 42, 
60. 
7 
order to encourage Americans to join in the war effort, the 
directors presented America and its allies as great and the 
Axis Powers as evil. 
However, these documentaries generally depict the two 
main Axis Powers, German and Japan, in different ways. 13 
The directors do not show Germans as completely evil. 
Hitler and the military leaders mislead the people; the 
leaders are evil, not the people. According to Michael 
Renov, "The wartime documentary film can . . be seen as 
an ideal domain of stereotypical discourse. " 14 
Documentaries show Japanese people to be as militaristic 
and evil as the emperor and the military leaders. The 
differences, which this thesis explores, are shocking. 
Germany and Italy were enemies to the United States, 
yet Japan received most of the animosity, partly because of 
the nature of the "sneak attack" on Pearl Harbor, but also 
partly because of racism. Racism had existed between the 
United States and Japan before 1941. The United States 
government passed various laws designed to limit Asian 
immigration. With the "Gentlemen's Agreement," Japan 
13 These documentaries usually show German and Italy together. Japan is 
separate from the two other Axis Powers. 
14 Michael Renov, "Warring Images: Stereotype and American 
Representations of the Japanese, 1941-1991." Abe Mark Nornes and 
Fukushima Yujio, ed. Japanese/American Film Wars: WWII Propaganda and 
Its Cultural Contexts {Langhorne, PA: Harwood Academic Publishers, 
1994), 103. 
8 
agreed not to issue passports to allow regular Japanese 
citizens to enter the United States. Japanese businessmen 
and other professionals were allowed to migrate, but the 
Agreement restricted unskilled laborers. 15 The 1917 
Immigration Act blocked South and Southeast Asians from 
entering the United States. 16 The National Origin Act of 
1924 restricted immigration in general to 150,000 a year, 
and the number of immigrants allowed from each nation 
depended on the proportion of Americans who traced their 
origins to that nation. 17 Japanese who had managed to enter 
the United States before 1925 could not become citizens 
unless they had served in the American military during 
World War I. Many Japanese immigrants made their homes on 
the West Coast and in the Territory of Hawaii. These 
"aliens," who called themselves "Issei," were not citizens, 
but their children, called "Nisei," were born in the United 
States, and therefore, citizens. Most Issei and Nisei in 
15 "Gentlemen's Agreement." Encyclopedia Britannica. [article on-line); 
available from 
http://www.britannica.com/eb/article?tocld=9036439&query=null&ct=null; 
Internet; accessed 5 April 2005; "Pacific Link: The KQED Asian 
Education Initiative." [article on-line]; available from 
http://www.kqed.org/w/pacificlink/history/usiw~igration/; Internet; 
accessed 5 April 2005. 
16 "Pacific Link: The KQED Asian Education Initiative." 
17 Mae M. Ngai, "The Architecture of Race in American Immigration Law: 
A Reexamination of the Immigration Act of 1924." The Journal of 
American History. 86 (June 1999). 67-92. [article on-line]; available 
from http://history.uchicago.edu/faculty/MaeNgai/ngai.html and 
http://www.historycooperative.org/journals/jah/86.1/index.html; 
accessed 5 April 2005. 
9 
California lived prosperous lives until the attack on Pearl 
Harbor. 
The attack on Pearl Harbor not only convinced 
Americans that they should join the war, but it also 
triggered increasing racial tensions until the war was over 
in 1945. 18 One reason for the sentiments was the sneak 
attack. Another reason was Americans could not believe 
that a nation such as Japan, not a Western power, had 
defeated and humiliated them in battle. 19 A third reason 
for the sentiments was the impact of atrocities the 
Japanese military committed, such as the Bataan Death 
March. 
To maintain support for the war, American military 
leaders commissioned Hollywood directors and filmmakers to 
persuade skeptical or non-committed citizens why the United 
States had to fight in World War II. Hollywood filmmakers 
responded by producing and directing documentaries. The 
18 The Immigration Act of 1924 ended all Japanese immigration to the 
United States. Japanese who managed to get into the States could not 
become citizens. However, many entered the country illegally and made 
their homes on the West Coast. These "illegal aliens" called 
themselves "Issei." Their children, born in the United States, and 
therefore citizens, they called "Nisei." After the attack on Pearl 
Harbor, President Franklin Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9066, which 
ordered Issei and Nisei on the West Coast into internment camps; 
"America Memory Project: Immigration/Migration: Today and During the 
Great Depression." The Library of Congress. [article on-line); 
available from 
http://lcweb2.1oc.gov/arnmem/ndlpedu/£eatures/irnmig/japanese.html; 
Internet; accessed 16 November 2004. 
19 John W. Dower, War Without Mercy: Race & Power in the Pacific War 
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1986), 33, 35, 83, 86, 100. 
10 
military leaders asked two notable directors, John Ford and 
Frank Capra, to head film divisions in the military. Both 
directors used their talents to reshape America's hatred of 
the Japanese into a will to defeat them. 20 Ford and Capra 
used the long-standing racial prejudice in America in order 
to create propaganda films; the documentaries that these 
two men produced depicted Japan as America's real enemy, as 
opposed to Italy and Germany. 
The ways that World War II documentaries affected 
American resolve is not a new topic. Historians such as 
John Dower, Thomas Doherty, Scott Morton, Charles Ewing, 
and Frederick William Pearce have discussed documentaries. 21 
All five focus primarily on Capra's Why We Fight series. 
Dower explores how Americans shifted from racial hatred of 
20 The military asked John Huston to direct documentaries. The 
documentaries he produced during the War, The Battle of San Pietro and 
Report from the Aleutians were quickly pulled from general release. 
Both documentaries focus heavily on the tragedy of war. Huston shows 
dead Americans in both documentaries. He said that he wanted to show 
war as it really was. George C. Marshall relented and showed San Pietro 
as a Lraining film. Because Huston's documentaries were not released 
to the general public, he is not included in this paper; •The Battle of 
San Pietro." Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia. [article on-line); 
available from http://e~.wikipedia.org/wiki/The Battle of San Pietro; 
accessed 28 February 2005. 
21 See the following historical analysis for more information about 
World War II documentaries: Dower, War Without Mercy; Thomas Doherty, 
Projections of War: Hollywood, American Culture, and World War II (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1999); A. Morton, " 'Why We Fight': 
An Analysis of Filmic Construction in its Role of Propaganda During 
World War II" (M.A. thesis, University of Alabama, 1997); Charles B. 
Ewing •An Analysis of Frank Capra's War Rhetoric in the 'Why We Fight' 
Films." Ph.D. diss., Washington State University, 1983; Frederick 
William Pearce. •An Analysis of Frank Capra's Why We Fight Films, 
1942-1945 as Documentary Film Rhetoric." Ph.D. diss., University of 
Pittsburg, 1991. 
11 
Japan to tolerance after 1945 by incorporating 
documentaries, like Capra's, and cartoons. Dower explores 
both sides' racial propaganda. Doherty attempts to explain 
how documentaries and feature films changed culture. Of 
the five, only Doherty discusses Ford's documentaries in 
detail. Morton and Ewing focus on the themes of the Why We 
Fight series, such as the difference between the "slave 
world" and the ufree world,n 22 while Pearce analyzes how 
Capra chose the shots, music, lighting, and sounds. This 
thesis will examine the films, first to see if they are 
true documentaries or merely propaganda pieces, and second, 
to see how they promoted racial intolerance, intentional or 
not. 
In the next chapter, I will give a brief background of 
the two directors, John Ford and Frank Capra. The chapter 
will also explore their military involvement. It will also 
examine how World War II affected the two directors and 
their post-War work. 
22 Frank Capra, prod. and dir., Why We Fight: Prelude to War. 




Rear Ad~iral John Ford, born in 1894, is one of 
Hollywood's greatest directors. Although he is more famous 
for his westerns such as Stagecoach, which usually starred 
John Wayne," he was equally adept at drama. Ford, nominated 
for seven Academy Awards for his work in movies,.won three 
times. 2 
Ford promotes the ideal of the rugged American hero in 
his films. 3 No matter what obstacles the hero has to 
overcome, he will be able to succeed. In addition, the 
hero generally battles the world and its problems alone. 
After the attack on Pearl Harbor, Ford signed up for 
the military, along with many other filmmakers. He joined 
the United States Navy and served in its Field Photographic 
John Wayne best embodied the image of Ford's heroes. Ford directed 
Wayne in fifteen movies throughout the director's seven-decade career; 
"John Ford (I): Director Filmography." Internet Movie Database. 
[movie list on-line]; available from 
ht:tp://www.imdb.com/name/nm0000406/; accessed 17 November 2004; "John 
Wayne (I): Actor Filmography." Internet Movie Database. [movie list 
on-line]; available from http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0000078/; accessed 
17 November 2004. 
2 "John Ford (I): Awards." Internet Movie Database. [movie list on-
line]; available from http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0000406/awards; 
accessed 18 February 2005. 
3 Ford directed Wayne in fifteen movies throughout the director's seven-
decade career; "John Ford (I): Director Filmography." Internet Movie 
Database. [movie list on-line]; available from 
http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0000406/; accessed 17 November 2004; "John 
Wayne (I): Actor Filmography." Internet Movie Database. [movie list 
on-line); available from http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0000078/; accessed 
17 November 2004. 
13 
Branch by producing documentaries for the War Department. 4 
Although his duty was directing films, he saw action. He 
recorded the naval operation in Doolittle's raid. Ford, 
wounded while filming the Battle of Midway, received a 
Purple Heart. 5 
His edited footage became the Academy Award winning 
documentary Battle of Midway (1942) 6 Midway was one of the 
first documentaries to show real fighting. This 
documentary put the American audiences into the battle 
itself like no other American documentary before. The 
camera is in the midst of the action when Japanese fighter 
planes are attacking aircraft carriers and the base during 
the Battle of Midway. The camera shakes with each hit. 
A year later, he produced December 7th and won another 
Academy Award for it. 7 December 7th (1943) covered the 
attack on Pearl Harbor and its aftermath. It combined real 
footage of the attack and staged recreations. The original 
film, directed by Gregg Toland, a cinematographer who had 
4 ~John Ford." Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia. [article on-line]; 
available from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John Fcrd; accessed 21 
February 2005. 
5 Doherty, Projections of War, 252, 255. 
6 "Awards for Battle of Midway, The (1942) ." Internet Movie Database. 
[movie list on-line]; available from 
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0034498/awards; accessed 17 November 2004. 
It won "Best Documentary, Short Subject;" "Awards for December 7th 
(1943) ." Internet Movie Database. [movie list on-line]; available 
from htto://www.imdb.com/title/tt0035790/awards; accessed 17 November 
2004. 
14 
worked with Ford on The Grapes of Wrath. 8 Toland's 
documentary was a rambling eighty-four-minute feature; Ford 
cut it down to a slim thirty-two-minute short. 
Ford continued directing pro-America feature films 
after World War II as well as serving in the Navy. 
Although he made some of his greatest westerns after 1945, 
he only directed one feature film about World War II: They 
Were Expendable (1945), starring John Wayne and Robert 
Montgomery. This film told the tale of a PT boat crew in 
Manila Bay. The title reflects Ford's attitude to the 
early part of the war in the Pacific Theater: the soldiers 
were expendable and were desperate to defeat the Japanese. 9 
Lieutenant-Colonel Frank Capra, born in 1897 in Italy, 
is another classic Hollywood director. 10 Although many 
modern movie buffs and critics attack Capra's "feel-good" 
'1 
movies by calling them soft or "Capra-corn,"~- his movies 
are immensely popular and influential. He is most famous 
for the classic screwball comedy, It Happened One Night 
8 ~Gregg Toland." Internet Movie Database. [movie list on-line]; 
available from http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0005904/; accessed 5 April 5, 
2005. 
9 ~They Were Expendable." Internet Movie Database [movie list on-line]; 
available from http://www.irndb.ccm/title/tt0038160/combined; accessed 5 
April 2005. 
10 "Frank Capra." Internet Movie Database. [movie list on-line]; 
available from htto://www.imdb.com/narne/nrn0001008/; accessed 23 
February 2005. 
11 Critics dubbed Capra's films "Capra-corn" due to the movies' 
simplistic plots and sentimentality. "Biography for Frank Capra." 
Internet Movie Database. [biography on-line]; available from 
http://www.imdb.com/narne/nm0001008/bio; accessed 23 February 2005. 
15 
(1934), 12 Mr. Smith Goes to Washington (1939), and It's a 
Wonderful Life (1946). 
Part of the reason that many consider Capra's films to 
be so sentimental are their sappy plots. Critics focus on 
the uplifting endings that celebrate the individual 
American spirit and humanitarianism, such as the ending to 
It's a Wonderful Life. Capra's films have more depth in 
them than many people give him credit for. 13 
The director joined the Navy after the attack on Pearl 
Harbor, but unlike Ford, he never saw any fighting. He 
wanted to join the Signal Corps so he could join the fight; 
instead, Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall, 
knowing Capra was a popular director, reassigned Capra to 
the "Morale Branch" in an effort to keep the military and 
civilian morale high. 14 Marshall asked the director to 
produce a series of documentaries that would explain to 
soldiers why they were fighting. Initially, Capra refused, 
12 It Happened One Night is one of the few movies that swept the four 
biggest categories at the Academy Awards: Best Actress (Claudette 
Colbert), Best Actor (Clark Gable), Best Director (Capra) and Best 
Picture; uAwards for It Happened One Night." Internet Movie Database. 
[movie list on-line]; available from 
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0025316/awards; accessed 23 February 2005. 
13 James Stewart best embodied the image of Capra heroes. Capra 
directed Stewart in three movies throughout the director's five-decade 
career; "Frank Capra: Director Filmography." Internet Movie Database. 
[movie list on-line]; available from 
http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0001008/; accessed 17 November 2004; "James 
Stewart (I): Actor Filmography." Internet Movie Database. [movie 
list on-line]; available from htto://www.imdb.com/name/nm0000071/; 
accessed 17 November 2004. 
14 Frank Capra, The Name Above the Title (New York: The MacMillan 
Company, 1971), 328. 
16 
claiming he did not know how to direct documentaries, 
having never actually seen one. He changed his mind when 
the general reminded him that most soldiers had never seen 
combat either. 15 
Capra's first research was watching Leni Riefenstahl's 
Triumph of the Will. He realized that he could emphasize 
American strengths and downplay the Axis Powers' 
achievements. Many film critics and historians consider 
the series of documentaries Capra produced, Why We Fight, 
to be a masterpiece of wartime propaganda, surpassed only 
by Triumph of the Will. 16 Capra won the Academy Award for 
Best Documentary for the first film of the Why We Fight 
series, "Prelude to War,n (1943) and was nominated for Best 
Documentary for the second film of the series, "The Battle 
of Russian (1943) . 17 
Capra's goal was to release the Why We Fight series 
for the troops. After President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
15 Ibid, 327-328. See also Dower, War Without Mercy, 15; Doherty, 
Projections of War, 24, 70. 
16 "Frank Capra." Wikipedia. [encyclopedia article on-line]; available 
from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frank Capra; accessed 23 February 
2005. See also Doherty, Projections of War, 70; William T. Murphy, 
"The United States Government and the Use of Motion Pictures During 
World War II." Abe Mark Nornes and Fukushima Yujio, ed. 
Japanese/American Film Wars: WWII Propaganda and Its Cultural Contexts 
(Langhorne, PA: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1994), 63. 
17 "Awards for Prelude to War (1943)." Internet Movie Database. [movie 
list on-line]; available from 
http://www.irndb.com/title/tt0035209/awards; accessed 23 February 2005; 
See also "Awards for The Battle of Russia (1943) ." Internet Movie 
Database. [movie list on-line]; available from 
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0036629/awards; accessed 23 February 2005. 
17 
viewed the first documentary, "Prelude to War," he ordered 
theater owners to show this film to citizens. 18 
Capra originally intended to produce a series of 
documentaries designed to introduce Americans to their 
enemies and allies. He was only able to produce two 
feature-length documentaries. The War Department released 
Capra's first enemy documentary, Your Job in Germany 
(1945), after Germany surrendered, so soldiers and 
civilians missed this documentary for the most part. 19 
Capra released his second, Know Your Enemy: Japan (1945), 
before the dropping of the atomic bombs and Japanese 
surrender. Many historians consider Know Your Enemy to be 
equal to Capra's Why We Fight series in terms of wartime 
propaganda. It certainly is a good display of racial and 
cultural propaganda. This documentary introduced Americans 
to Japanese history, culture, and religion. Although he 
first developed the script in 1942, he was uncertain if he 
should blame the war on the Japanese people or the Japanese 
leaders. However, he had the misfortune to release the 
film on August 9, which was the day the United States 
dropped the second atomic bomb on Nagasaki. On August 28, 
18 Capra, Name, 346. See also Doherty, Projections of War, 70-71; 
Dower, War Without Mercy, 70-71. 
19 "Your Job in Germany (1945) ." Internet Movie Database. [movie list 
on-line]; available from http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0038264/combined; 
accessed 23 February 2005. 
18 
General Douglas MacArthur ordered Capra to withdraw the 
film. 20 
Capra continued directing pro-American feature films 
during and after World War II. His most famous film, It's 
a Wonderful Life, was Jimmy Stewart's first post-war movie. 
This movie paints small-town American life throughout the 
first four decades of the twentieth century as idyllic and 
peaceful to most American citizens. Many people find the 
film sentimental and ~capra-corn," but it reflects more of 
Capra's darker outlook of life after World War II even 
though It's a Wonderful Life ends happily and 
sentimentally. The movie tells the story of one man, 
George Bailey, played by Stewart, who does not share the 
same optimism about small town life and basic American 
values experienced by most of his community and by his 
family. He is an ambitious man who wants to leave his 
small hometown to travel, but events keep him from leaving. 
At the end, George is driven to attempt suicide and is cast 
into a nightmarish world, full of hate, mistrust, and 
prejudice, where he does not exist. After experiencing 
this world, George believes that his life, although a usual 
American life, is heavenly. Although the movie did not 
find an audience in 1946, it received a new life on 
20 Dower, War Without Mercy, 18. 
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television after the film's copyright expired. 21 Now It's a 
Wonderful Life is an annual Christmas event on television. 
John Ford once called Frank Capra, "A great man and a 
great American . an inspiration to those who believe in 
the American Dream. " 22 However, Capra's directing career 
stalled after the 1950s. He died in 1991. 23 
Capra's directing career spanned five decades. 24 He 
was a popular director before the advent of World War II, 
and continued to produce and director timeless classics 
after 1945. His World War II documentary series, Why We 
Fight, continues to influence directors today. Many 
historians consider the Why We Fight series to be one of 
the greatest wartime documentaries. 
The next chapter focuses on John Ford's Oscar-winning 
documentary, The Battle of Midway. It examines the images 
that John Ford used and explores whether they are racial in 
nature. The chapter also focuses on the narration that 
21 ~Trivia for 'It's a Wonderful Life'." Internet Movie Database. 
[trivia list on-line]' available from 
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0038650/trivia; accessed 5 April 2005. 
22 "Biography for Frank Capra." Internet Movie Database. [biography 
on-line]; available from http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0001008/bio; 
accessed 23 February 2005. 
23 ~Frank Capra." Wikipedia. [encyclopedia article on-line]; available 
from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frank Capra; accessed 23 February 
2005. 
24 ~Frank Capra." Internet Movie Database. [movie list on-line]; 
available from http://www.imdb.com/narne/nm0001008/;accessed 6 April 
2005. 
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Battle of Midway (1942) 
John Ford's Battle of Midway is the oldest of these 
World War II documentaries, and countless war documentaries 
since 1942 have used Ford's documentary footage. 1 Ford, 
wounded while filming, recorded the battle as it was 
happening. Naval intelligence cracked the Japanese 
military code and discovered their plans to attack the 
small island of Midway. Ford went to the island early to 
record the preliminaries of the battle. The film covers 
the battle itself, but does not discuss much on the 
aftermath because no one knew what the long-range 
consequences were. The immediate outcome, which Ford 
focuses on, includes the number of Japanese ships that were 
lost and the number of American men who were causalities. 
For this documentary, Ford recruited many people he 
had worked with before. In fact, this documentary in post-
production was essentially a Grapes of Wrath (1940) 
reunion. Henry Fonda and Jane Darwell served as narrators. 
Obviously, Ford wanted to pick people he knew and was 
1 It is interesting to note how many times the footage is used 
erroneously as footage of the Pearl Harbor attack. One of the most 
common parts of this documentary that is found in countless Pearl 
Harbor documentaries is the ambulance driving through the wreckage of 
the base on Midway. See the History Channel's World War II 
documentaries. 
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comfortable with to help him in the presentation of the 
battle. 2 
The Navy kept most of Ford's film because some parts 
could compromise the American intelligence at work in the 
Pacific Theater. 3 However, they allowed him to release an 
eighteen-minute short. 4 The documentary was released the 
second week of September 1942 to promote bond drives 5 in 
American theaters. The public was astonished at the 
realistic attack sequences, since the newsreels they had 
been seeing could not get them into the battle like Ford's 
documentary. 6 
By the definition presented on page two of this 
thesis, Battle of Midway is a documentary film, not a 
propaganda film. Ford captured all of the footage while on 
the island of Midway. All of the battle footage is real, 
not staged. The only bit that was added to the footage was 
the title cards that reported Japanese losses to the 
American public. Ford edited his documentary film to 
emphasize Japan's cruelty and inhumanity in war. He wished 
to convey this image of Japan to the American public in 
2 ftThe Battle of Midway (1942) ." Internet Movie Database. [movie list 
on-line]; available from http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0034498/combined; 
accessed 6 April 2005. See also "The Grapes of Wrath (1940) ." 
Internet Movie Database. [movie list on-line]; available from 
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0032551/combined; accessed 6 April 2005. 
3 Doherty, Projections of War. 237. 
4 "The Battle of Midway." Internet Movie Database 
5 Another form of propaganda. 
6 Doherty, Projections of War. 237. 
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order to boost their morale and keep the fighting spirit 
strong. 
Ford's narration is what might make this documentary a 
propaganda film. Ford wrote and added the narration after 
he edited the film. The narration functions as propaganda-
it does not depict reality but rather the official, 
political message and the director's own version of 
reality. The words both support and overshadow the images 
at the same time. 
In Battle of Midway John Ford uses images of birds to 
suggest that the Japanese were not as intelligent as 
Americans. The first image is a shot of seagulls and the 
ever-present albatross walking along a beach, and the 
narrator, Henry Fonda, says, "These are the natives of 
Midway. [Japan's Premiere General] Tojo has sworn to 
liberate them." 7 At the end, Ford revisits the birds, and 
Fonda points out that even though Tojo did not free "the 
natives," they were "as free as they ever were."8 With this 
bit of narration and imagery, Ford shows that no one can 
liberate birds, although Japan is foolishly trying to do 
so. 
7 John Ford, prod. and dir. The Battle of Midway. 




(World War II 
Digital Video 
The documentary continues with the notion that the 
Japanese are cowardly. Ford shows the searches by the 
PBYs, the patrol planes, and the attack starting. He shows 
the sky, and Japanese planes suddenly appear behind some 
clouds. Strategically, this is the best way to strafe a 
base, since cloud cover and flying out of the sun give an 
advantage to attacking planes. The planes are harder to 
see, and they are more difficult to hit with anti-aircraft 
fire. 9 However, Midway had radar; therefore, the attacking 
planes were not a surprise. However, Fonda's voice-over 
implies cowardice for the Japanese not showing themselves 
sooner. Japanese Zeros fly from behind cloud cover, and 
Fonda's voice is heard exclaiming, "There! Behind the 
clouds! The Japs attack!" 1u 
Ford devotes over five minutes of his fifty-minute 
documentary to the important idea that Japan does not 
respect life or offer mercy. After the battle, Ford shows 
an ambulance taking wounded soldiers to a hospital on 
Midway. Jane Darwell, the second narrator, grieves for the 
losses and hopes the wounded "boys" will recover. The 
director shows a bombed, destroyed hospital in answer to 
her wish, while Fonda sarcastically notes, "On (the 
9 Margaret Kim, ex. Prod. Command Decision: Battle of Midway. (The 
History Channel, 30 July 2004). 
1° Ford, Midway. 
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hospital's] roof [was] a cross, plainly marked, a symbol of 
mercy the enemy was bound to respect." 11 Ford implies that 
Japanese cannot be trusted or respected if they are so 
willing to destroy things with "symbols of mercy" on them. 12 
Ford has a symbolic ending to his documentary. He 
concludes his documentary with a roll call of Japanese 
losses. The three title cards read, "4 Japanese carriers 
sunk"; "28 Jap Battleships, Cruisers, Destroyers sunk or 
damaged"; and "300 Japanese Aircraft Destroyed." 13 Over 
each title, paint splashes on the words. The red paint 
drips like blood on the first card. On the second card, a 
black "X" appears. The color black represents evil and 
death. 14 Someone paints over the titles on the last card 
with a red V, which fades out slower than the words. 15 The 
red V represents American blood and victory over Japan. 
There is more to Battle of Midway than simply a look 
at a turning point in war, and the Japanese are seen as 
something other than a wartime enemy. This documentary 
film uses some propaganda techniques to support some of the 
11 Ibid. 
12 This was not the first time Americans criticized Japanese for 
destroying clearly marked non-combatants. In 1937, Japanese sunk the 
USS Panay. The Japanese originally claimed they thought the ship was a 
Chinese ship. Later, the Japanese military leaders and government 
apologized for the "mistake," but Americans thought that the attack was 
not an accident. Newsweek. 10 (December 27, 1937): 7-11. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Morton, " 'Why We Fight': An Analysis of Filmic Construction in its 
Role of Propaganda During World War II," 61. 
15 Ford, Midway. 
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long-standing racial prejudices that Americans had. 
Americans are set above the Japanese, but the sense is that 
the Japanese are not human enough to measure up to 
Americans. After all, the Japanese are trying to liberate 




December 7th (194 3) 
In 1943, John Ford produced December 7th, which was a 
recreation of the attack on Pearl Harbor. Gregg Toland, 
Ford's cinematographer from The Grapes of Wrath (1940), 
directed the original eighty-four-minute documentary, and 
Ford edited it down to thirty-two minutes. Ford directed 
some of the incidental moments of the film, such as a 
created scene of a priest blessing the American soldiers 
before they dispersed to their battle stations. 1 
Countless documentaries and feature films made since 
1943 use footage from December 7th. 2 One image that pops up 
in just about every Pearl Harbor documentary is the 
artificial scene with the priest. Even Capra used this 
scene in one of his Why We Fight documentaries. 3 
Although Ford only directed bits of the documentary, 
December 7th was credited to him as much as it was credited 
to Toland. It won the Best Documentary Oscar for 1943, 
even though most of the film involved staged recreations. 
1 Ford, prod. December 7th. (World War II Greatest Battles Series 
GoodTimes Home Video, 1943). Digital Video Disc, 2001. 
2 The feature films Tora! Tara! Tara! (1970) and the most recent film 
Pearl Harbor both stage a recreation scene of the priest blessing the 
troops. Richard Fleischer and Kinji Fukusaku, directors. Tora! Tora! 
Tora!. Twentieth Century Fox, 1970, Digital Video Disc, 2004; Michael 
Bay, dir. Pearl Harbor. Walt Disney Home Video, 2001, Digital Video 
Disc, 2003. 
3 Capra used the priest blessing the troops in War Comes to America. 
Capra, Why We Fight: War Comes to America. (GoodTimes Home Video, 
1945), Digital Video Disc, 2000. 
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Ford and Toland's goal was to show highlights of the 
attack, including a spectacular shot of the explosion of 
the Arizona. 4 
Unlike Ford's Battle of Midway, December 7th is a true 
propaganda film. The film begins with a statement from the 
Navy Department. Although this film uses some real footage 
of the attack on Pearl Harbor, Ford and Toland stage most 
of the film. They use fiction, staged scenes, and 
animation to convey a message to the audience. This 
official message manipulates the American public to view 
the Japanese as evil. The film also keeps the American 
public wanting to continue fighting (and to defeat) the 
true enemy: Japan. 
Ford's Battle of Midway is more subtle with its racial 
prejudice than December 7th. In the latter documentary, 
Ford presents Japanese pilots and Japanese leaders, such as 
Tojo, as subhuman. The attack begins when planes "swarmed 
into Pearl Harbor like locusts." The Japanese pilots 
sought to destroy property and sought to kill American 
soldiers, which is negative image of the Japanese pilots 
rather than true racial prejudice. 5 Regardless, Ford uses 
4 "December 7th (1943)." Internet Movie Database [movie list on-line]; 
available from htto://www.imdb.com/title/tt0035790/;accessed 17 November 
2004. 
5 The narrator, Walter Huston, "addressesH Premier Tojo. "Well, you may 
crow, Mr. Tojo. You've done a good job of stabbing the back. You've 
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this negative aspect as motivation to keep the American 
fighting spirit high. 
Perhaps the most disturbing bit of racism occurs after 
the attack. An animated radio tower rises over the island 
of Japan, and a gargoyle snakehead appears at the top of 
the radio tower. This head represents Premiere Tojo, who 
speaks to his people. The voice-over is in English with a 
broad, fake Japanese accent, complete with "L's" sounding 
like "R's." 6 Ford implies with this image that Japanese 
leaders are faceless monsters who rule over the people. 
The biggest part of the documentary relies on the 
image of deceit and betrayal. As the attack began, Ford 
notes that "Japan's smooth-talking, grinning [diplomats), 
Nomura and Kurusu, were blandly delivering to Mr. [Cordell) 
Hull a lengthy protestation of Japan's peace intentions. 
At this very deceitful moment, about two hundred of 
Japan's messengers of death swooped in over [the] Pacific 
Paradise." 7 To relate to the image of the "messengers of 
darkened our cities. You've destroyed our property. You've spilled 
our blood;" Ford, prod. and dir. December 7th. (World War II Greatest 
Battles Series GoodTimes Home Video, 1943). Digital Video Disc, 2001. 
6 The voiceover actor who does "Tojo's" voice-over says "Pacific 
'Freet';" Ibid. 
7 According to Gordon Prange, this was not true. The reality was that 
there was little reason for Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu to have prior 
knowledge of the attack. If the ambassadors knew about the attack 
beforehand, they might have accidentally exposed the plan. However, 
the Japanese government, beyond the two ambassadors, were deliberately 
deceitful and treacherous; Gordon Prange, At Dawn We Slept: The Untold 
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death," the narrator dramatically intones, "The treachery 
of an empire was on the wing." 8 
Ford expands on the idea of Japanese deceit by 
presenting them as cunning and as treacherous. He shows a 
depiction of an interview between a reporter and a Japanese 
Consul in Honolulu. 9 The Consul denies knowing anything 
about any attack by Japan, although the attack sirens were 
sounding at the time. Throughout the interview, the 
reporter gets increasingly hostile. At one point, the 
Consul says that he has "nothing to say." The reporter 
responds, "And judging by the smoke pouring out of your 
chimney, there'll be nothing left to show." 10 
To continue his argument, Ford presents the attack as 
sudden and without warning. Although he makes some brief 
mentions of events that might have prevented the attack, he 
does not alter his argument.l 1 In his eyes, it was a sneak 
attack, although in reality, the Japanese military did not 
Story of Pearl Harbor. New York: Penguin Books, 1981; reprint, 1991, 
355-356. 
8 Ford, December 7th. 
9 This interview is probably fictional. Ford certainly stages it. 
According to the timeline of the documentary, Japan is attacking the 
Fleet at the time of the interview. Sirens are going off in the 
background. Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ford mentions the miniature Japanese sub that the destroyer Ward sank 
more than an hour before the first attack began. He also mentions the 
ensign who spotted the first wave of Japanese planes on radar. 
Superior officers mistakenly informed the ensign that these were 
American planes from the mainland. Therefore, the officers did not 
raise any alert. However, Ford mentions these incidents very briefly, 
and almost as an afterthought. Ibid. 
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want the attack to be a surprise. 12 However, this detail 
might present the enemy as honorable and having human 
qualities. The narrator describes it as a "stab in the 
back" twice in the documentary. 13 The mental image of the 
United States receiving a "stab in the back" from Japan is 
a powerful one. It implies Japanese betrayal, and it 
refers to the surprise attack at Pearl Harbor. 
Ford makes the distinction between Americans of 
Japanese ancestry living on the Hawaiian Islands and the 
Japanese living in Japan. This seems to be his argument 
against the Japanese-American internment camps in the 
contiguous United States. He shows that Americans of 
Japanese ancestry relate more the United States than to 
Japan, and he shows these Americans trying "[to] erase 
their relationship with the homeland [permanently] . 14 " He 
12 Prange argues that it is against the Japanese code of honor to attack 
an unarmed opponent or enemy. Prange writes that Tokyo thought 
Secretary of State Cordell Hull would receive the fourteen-part 
declaration of war in time to alert the Pacific Fleet. Prange, At Dawn 
We Slept, 468; also see "Pearl Harbor: Days that Shook the World." 
History Channel. Original Airdate: Jan 29, 2005, Video Cassette, 2005; 
"Tara, Tora, Tara: The Real Story of Pearl Harbor." History Channel. 
Original Airdate: November 28, 2000. 
13 "War had come to American's tropical suburb. The Axis brand of war. 
A stab in the back Sunday morning" and "Well, you may crow, Mr. Tojo. 
You've done a good job of stabbing in the back." Ibid. 
14 Ford edited Toland's rambling 82-minute documentary. One of the 
things he cut was a dialogue between "Uncle Sam," played by Walter 
Huston, and Uncle Sam's conscience, "Mr. C," played by Harry Davenport. 
This dialogue consisted of an argument between the two men about the 
Japanese-American loyalty. Uncle Sam argues that most Japanese-
Americans are loyal citizens. Mr. C's view is essentially, "We need to 
lock all people of Japanese ancestry up and throw away the key." Bits 
of this dialogue can be found in Tom Thurman's John Ford Goes to War. 
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shows closed language schools and storeowners painting over 
written Japanese. One cafe owner takes down his sign 
"Banzai Cafe" and replaces it with a sign that reads, "Keep 
'Em Flying Cafe" in a staged scene. 15 
Although Ford shows Americans of Japanese ancestry 
erasing memories of Japan, the scenes are artificial. 
Anti-Japanese sentiment forced these Japanese-Americans to 
deny their "homeland" of Japan, even if they had nothing to 
do with the attack and were not spies for their homeland. 
In a climate of fear and paranoia that resulted in 
thousands of Japanese-Americans on the West Coast being 
sent to internment camps, it is easy to imagine that this 
cafe owner had to prove that he was a loyal American by 
taking down his "Banzai Cafe" sign. 
Although December 7th was not solely John Ford's film, 
it reflected his view of the Japanese. This film depicts 
some of the most blatant anti-Japanese racism in World War 
II documentaries about the Pacific Theater. However, the 
edited version presents hope for the future. In the edited 
version, Ford argues that Americans of Japanese ancestry 
are loyal citizens who want to be Americans, not Japanese. 
Tom Thurman, director. John Ford Goes to War, 2002. MoviePlex Channel, 
15 February 2005. 
15 Ibid. 
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December 7th is pure propaganda. Although December 7th 
has some of the most blatant racial prejudice against the 
Japanese people, the film's message seems to have more in 
common with encouraging American nationalism than with 
genuine racial prejudice. Ford presents the official line 
that the cause for Japanese hatred should derive from the 
fact that Japanese were deceitful and treacherous, which 
were common forms of anti-Asian bias, and these traits are 
displayed in the "sneak" attack. 
The next chapter will begin the study of Frank Capra's 
documentaries. The entire chapter will focus exclusively 
on the classic Why We Fight series. It is more 
sophisticated in its racist depictions, but the racism is 
evident in the documentaries. 
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Chapter Five: 
Why We Fight Series (1942-1945) 
Shortly after Pearl Harbor, Army Chief of Staff George 
C. Marshall approached Frank Capra to direct a series of 
documentaries explaining to the American troops why they 
were fighting in the Second World War. Marshall wanted 
these documentaries to show the troops their enemies and 
articulate what America could lose if the Axis Powers won 
the war. Finally, he also believed that standard military 
and orientation films were boring, and Capra could keep the 
military and civilians' morale high. 1 
Capra initially balked at the command, claiming he had 
never seen a documentary before. Marshall reminded him 
that most of these soldiers for whom Capra was making the 
documentaries had never fought in a war before. 2 He agreed 
with that fact, and he resolved himself to direct the 
classic series Why We Fight, which contrasted the allied 
nations with the Axis Powers. 3 
Many historians of film consider Capra's Why We Fight 
series to be surpassed only by Leni Riefenstahl's Triumph 
of the Will. Capra's documentaries are more subtle and 
sophisticated in their racial rhetoric than John Ford's 
documentaries. He rarely strays away from his goal, which 
1 Doherty, Projections of War, 70. 
2 Capra, Name, 327-328. 
3 Ibid. 
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was to differentiate between the "free" world of the Allied 
Democracies and the "slave" world of the Axis Powers. 4 
Capra uses captured Axis footage, such as footage from 
Riefenstahl's Triumph of the Will, to supplement his films 
along with animation produced by the Walt Disney Studio. 5 
Although Capra uses animation to supplement these 
films, they are documentaries. He uses genuine war footage 
to support his vision of the Axis Powers. 6 Even though he 
is presenting the official message about the enemy, he 
believes he is doing a public service by presenting what 
the American public and troops needs to know about the 
enemy. 7 
The first film, Prelude to War (1943), groups the 
three Axis Powers together. The Axis nations have similar 
images, 8 and the animation and narration included Japan, 
Germany, and Italy as members of the "slave" world and 
enemies to America. The Walt Disney Studio animators 
depict the Axis's conquering of other nations as a wall of 
black, engulfing the victim nation. In addition, the three 
nations turn into threatening objects-Germany turns into 
4 Capra was an immigrant. He was born in Italy. His immigrant status 
probably shaped Capra's view of the "slave" world, of which Italy was 
part. In addition, it was in the United States where Capra found a 
prosperous career. In Italy, Capra's family was illiterate; in 
America, the family had opportunities. Ibid, 6-8, 9, 237. 
5 Ibid, 336. 
6 Ibid. 328. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Capra, Prelude to War. 
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the Swastika, Italy turns into a hammer, and Japan turns 
into a dragon. Capra wanted Americans to know that the 
Axis Powers are a real threat to the United States. If the 
Axis Powers win the war, they would commit the same acts of 
wartime atrocities on the United States that they did in 
China, Poland, and Ethiopia. 9 
Capra includes obvious racial prejudice in the same 
film. He mentions that Hitler wanted to meet "his buck-
toothed pals" in the United States. This derogatory 
statement refers to a stereotype of the Japanese. Capra 
exposes American fears of invasion by Japanese forces in 
Prelude to War. In an attempt to increase American 
paranoia of invasion, he uses a bit of racial propaganda 
and double-exposed film to depict Japanese soldiers 
marching through Washington, D.C. He warns the American 
public that Japan would do the same atrocities in the 
United States that the Japanese soldiers perpetrated on 
Nanking, Hong Kong, and Manila. However, in this image, 
Capra ignores German atrocities in Europe. 10 
In the fifth movie of the series, Divide and Conquer, 
which covers Germany invading Austria, Czechoslovakia, and 
Poland, ending with the invasion of France, Capra uses 
9 Ibid. 
1° Capra showing the Japanese army marching through Washington, D.C. 
makes some sense. After all, Japan, not Germany, attacked the United 
States. Ibid; Dower, War Without Mercy, 16. 
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footage of President Franklin Roosevelt saying, "The hand 
that held the dagger has struck it into the back of its 
neighbor" to describe German treachery and deception. 11 
However, the animators do not use the visual image of the 
dagger to describe Germany. 12 The animation consistently 
presents Germany and Italy as a black wall that engulfs 
other nations. According to the animators, Germany and 
Italy pour into the victim nations, and the boundaries 
disappear. Although the black is menacing, the 
disappearing borders between nations imply a merging of the 
countries. 13 
Capra expands John Ford's idea in December 7th that 
Japanese betrayed nations and the United States by 
comparing Japan to a dagger. In Capra's documentaries that 
describe a Japanese conquest, the animators represent the 
conquest not as engulfing black wall but as a knife with 
the Rising Sun symbol on it. This knife stabs into victim 
nations, including America. In War Comes to America, Capra 
continues the dagger image. Walter Huston, the narrator, 
11 Roosevelt's speech refers to the Italian attack on France in 1940. 
Therefore, Capra confuses the image. He mainly uses the dagger image 
to describe Japanese aggression; originally, this phrase was made to 
describe Italian aggression, but Capra uses the phrase completely out 
of context. Capra, Why We Fight: Divide and Conquer. (GoodTimes Home 
Video, 1943), Digital Video Disc, 2000. 
12 The episodes that include the dagger to describe are The Battle of 
China and War Comes to America. In the latter movie, which includes 
German and Italian aggression, Capra uses the image the dagger 
exclusively to describe Japan. 
13 Capra, Divide and Conquer. 
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declares that America was impeding Japan's expansion into 
the South Pacific and into China, so "[the United States] 
had to be removed the Japanese way." Apparently, the 
"Japanese way" includes a knife slamming into the middle of 
the United States. 14 
Although this image of the dagger is not necessarily 
racist in nature, it is a negative aspect. The very image 
implies treachery and deceit, which many Americans believed 
were Asian traits. Capra uses the dagger image to 
encourage the troops to continue to fight their enemy. 
Capra ignores the Russo-Japanese War, which took place 
in 1904. Russia and Japan fought over control of Manchuria 
and Korea. After about a year of fighting, Japan won, 
which shocked the Western superpowers. Japan proved that 
it was a military power and could defeat an established 
superpower. 15 Including this war would give Japan too much 
authority as a power. Capra focuses instead on the 
Japanese invasion of China and Manchuria to explain why 
Japanese are deceivers. 
The sixth movie in the series, The Battle of China 
(1944), is the only episode that focuses exclusively on 
Japan. The film is about the fighting in China from 1935 
14 Capra, War Comes to America. 
15 "Russo-Japanese War." Wikipedia. [encyclopedia article on-line]; 
available from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russo-Japanese War; 
accessed 7 April 2005. 
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to 1944. Capra provides a distinction between ancient, 
noble, allied China and barbarous, "blood-crazed" Japan. 16 
In the past, the United States included Chinese people 
in immigration bans that also affected Japanese people. 
Originally, Americans saw Chinese and Japanese as the same 
people (Asians) who happened to live in different 
countries. 17 Shortly before the advent of World War II, 
American ideas regarding the Chinese changed: Americans 
saw China not as a barbarous, South Asian nation, but as a 
noble, proud nation and partner. Missionaries exposed 
Americans to Chinese culture. The novels by Pearl Buck, 
such as The Good Earth, spoke about the contrast between 
the poverty found in China and the nobility of the nation's 
ancient heritage. 18 Henry Luce, a founder of Time Magazine, 
was born and raised in China, so he also contradicted the 
myth of Chinese inferiority that Americans felt in the 
latter part of the 1800s. 19 Trade between the two nations 
increased, and China used Western industry to improve their 
16 Capra, Why We Fight: The Battle of China. (GoodTimes Home Video, 
1944), Digital Video Disc, 2000. 
17 Colliers featured a cover story about the Boxer Rebellion in China. 
Included are images of Japanese Samurai. So, according to Western 
thought in the early 1900s, China and Japan are the same things. 
Collier's Weekly 24 (September 22, 1900): cover. 
18 "About Our Founder: Pearl S. Buck." Pearl S. Buck International: 
Bringing Hope to Children Worldwide. [on-line web site); available 
from http://www.pearl-s-buck.org/psbi/PearlSBuck/about.asp; accessed 7 
April 2005. 
19 "Henry Luce." TIME: About TIME: Bios: Founders: Henry Luce. 
[on-line web site]; available from http://www.time-
planner.com/planner/about time/bios/founders/henry luce.html; 
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impoverished way of life. 20 Moreover, in World War II, 
America and China were allied against a common, barbarous 
enemy, which made China like the United States. 21 
In reality, the United States had greater trade with 
Japan than with China prior to World War II. China was 
poor, while Japan was had money to spend. Even though 
Americans allied themselves emotionally with China, the 
nation could not afford much of Western trade. Japan was 
richer and was quickly becoming a Pacific superpower. 
Americans might not have understood Japan's militarism or 
political goals, but they liked the Japanese trade. 22 
Capra presents the Japanese as deceivers. According 
to his documentaries, they betrayed us by obtaining the 
Western industry, or "civilization," and used the industry, 
not to improve their way of life, but to make wars of 
conquest and "to create one of the world's most powerful 
war machines." Japanese soldiers attempted to conquer 
China to utilize its resources and its work force, although 
the Japanese military was not able to accomplish its goal. 
The Japanese Navy attacked the American gunboat Panay, and 
claimed the attack was an accident. 
2° Capra, The Battle of China. 
21 Ibid. 
These deceits built up 
22 "Henry Luce." TIME: About TIME: Bios: Founders: Henry Luce. 
[on-line web site] 
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until the attack on Pearl Harbor. 23 Anthony Veiller, the 
narrator, declares, "Without warning, as [the Japanese] 
have always struck, they struck again." A dramatic shot of 
the battleship Arizona blowing up follows his statement. 24 
Capra also cites the Tanaka Plan, or the Tanaka 
Memorial, as evidence that the Japanese were betrayers and 
"blood-crazed." This plan supposedly details the Japanese 
plan of conquest. According to the plan, the Japanese 
wanted to conquer Manchuria and China, to establish bases 
in the South Pacific, and to "conquer the United States."25 
The Tanaka Plan was public belief. In its December 27, 
1937 issue, Newsweek foreign correspondents write, "In line 
with the famous "Tanaka Memorial [Plan] the war lords see 
Tokyo's dominion systematically extended not only 
to ... China ... and, in time, to India beyond. In brief-
complete domination of Asia and the Pacific." 26 Historian 
John Dower stated in War Without Mercy, "Most scholars now 
agree that [the Tanaka Plan] was a masterful anti-Japanese 
hoax." 27 However, Capra did not know the Tanaka Plan was 
fake; he thought the plan was the truth. Popular 
23 Capra believed that the Pearl Harbor attack 
surprise. He was mistaken in his assumption. 
warnings prior to the attack. See Prange, At 
Day of Infamy. 
24 Capra, The Battle of China. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Newsweek. 10 (December 27, 1937) . 11. 
27 Dower, War Without Mercy, 22. 
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was sudden and a 
There were several 
Dawn We Slept and Lord, 
magazines, such as Newsweek presented the plan, so it was 
reasonable that Capra also presented it in his 
documentaries as if it was reality. 
Although Germany spread terrorism in Eastern Europe 
and in the Soviet Union, Capra chooses not to focus on 
Nazis as terrorists. The director correctly shows that the 
Japanese are aggressors who spread violence and fear 
throughout the South Pacific and Asia. However, Capra 
mistakenly states in The Battle of China, which focuses 
exclusively on the Chinese war brought about by Japan's 
invasion, ~[The Japanese] introduced to the world a new 
kind of war; a war of deliberate terrorization of 
deliberate mass-murder, of deliberate frightfulness." 28 In 
addition, the Japanese spread the ~small bonfires" of 
violence throughout the world ~until [everything] was 
aflame. " 29 
Capra describes the Japanese as violent barbarians. 
He compares ancient, "civilized" China, which "has never 
begun a war of conquest in its history," and Japan, America 
and China's enemy who attacked without warning. Anthony 
Veiller, the narrator, recounts almost gleefully that 
barbarians tried to defeat China before, and the country 
28 This is another misconception of Capra's. A terrorist style of 
warfare was used in the American Civil War. Terrorism is an ancient 
style of war. 
29 Ibid. 
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built the Great Wall of China to keep them out. Therefore, 
he and Capra suggest that China will overcome Japan. 30 
Capra does not think the Japanese have any human 
compassion or redeeming qualities. Rather, he views them 
as sub-human. This is pure racism. He compares the 
population to an octopus and thinks they are "slimy." 
Veiller intones, "The octopus still holds in its tentacles 
great stretches of territory. The barbarism which 
produced the Tojos and the slimy Kurusus still intoxicates 
the little yellow men, still promises them eternity in 
return for fanatic service to the God-Emperor." 31 
Although the Why We Fight series is more sophisticated 
and subtle in its depiction of American racism toward the 
Japanese, the racism is apparent. For example, Capra 
chooses to ignore some horrific things that Germany and 
Italy did in order to focus of Japan's deeds. Why We Fight 
includes the three Axis Powers and explores their 
treachery, but Japan seems to come off the worst of the 
three. Japan has the additional burden of being the only 





The Why We Fight series are documentaries that contain 
elements of propaganda. Capra mostly used real footage in 
his documentaries to present his viewpoint. The director 
believed that he was performing a public service by showing 
the troops what he believed was the truth: the Axis Powers 
were dangerous for all Americans. However, out of the 
three Axis Powers, Japan received the most animosity from 
Americans. In Capra's documentaries, he believes that the 
animosity came from a number of causes: feelings of 
betrayal and deceit from Pearl Harbor and "misusing" 
Western industry, paranoia about Japanese invasion, and 
simple racism. 
In the next chapter, I will explore Frank Capra's 
other classic documentary, Know Your Enemy: Japan. This 
documentary attempts to introduce Japan to the American 
public. Instead, it presents the Japanese people in a very 
stereotypical view. The reason behind Know Your Enemy: 
Japan is to present the Japanese as inferior to Americans. 
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Chapter Six: 
Know Your Enemy: Japan (1945) 
Along with the Why We Fight series, Frank Capra 
produced and directed a series of documentaries that 
focused on American enemies and allies. In 1945, he 
released Know Your Enemy: Japan. Like the Why We Fight 
series, Know Your Enemy compared the enemy's way of life to 
the American and western life. This documentary introduced 
Americans to Japanese history, culture, and religion. 
Although he had developed the script since 1942, he was 
uncertain if he should blame the war on the Japanese people 
or the Japanese leaders. 
However, he had the misfortune to release the film on 
August 9, 1945, which was the day the United States dropped 
the second atomic bomb on Nagasaki. On August 28, General 
Douglas MacArthur ordered Capra to withdraw the film. 1 
Japan was a defeated nation by the time Know Your Enemy: 
Japan premiered. By September 1945, the United States was 
helping to rebuild the conquered nation, so a film 
depicting the defeated population as subhuman was 
unacceptable. 
In spite of the controversy this film presented when 
it premiered in August 1945, historians of film considered 
1 Dower, War Without Mercy, 18. 
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it a masterful piece of propaganda and is considered to be 
one of America's greatest wartime documentaries. 2 This is 
also an influential propaganda film. Footage from Know 
Your Enemy: Japan is found in countless World War II 
documentaries made since 1945. It also supports the 
traditional Western view of Japan. 
Although Capra uses real footage in this propaganda 
film, his goal in Know Your Enemy: Japan is not to present 
Japanese fairly or accurately. This film stands in stark 
contrast with the Why We Fight series. In the earlier 
films, Capra presented the Japanese with more hostility and 
animosity than the Germans and Italians, but he made an 
effort to present the Japanese fairly. Instead of giving 
possible reasons for the animosity feelings for Japan, 
Capra emphasizes the feelings without attempting to explain 
them in Know Your Enemy. Outrageous cliches, such as a 
gong ringing to begin every section and, again, Japanese 
pronouncing "L'sn like "R's,n dominate the film. 3 
Historians should not classify Know Your Enemy: Japan 
as a documentary film. This is a propaganda film. Capra's 
intention is to convince the American public and troops to 
keep fighting a nearly completed war. In order to convince 
2 Ibid. 
3 Capra, Frank Capra's The War Years: Know Your Enemy: Japan. 
(RCA/Columbia Pictures Home Video, 1945), Videocassette, 1990. 
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the public, he wants Americans to view themselves as 
superior. 
Capra's first argument of Japanese inferiority is that 
the Japanese are not different from one another. The 
narrator calls the population an "obedient mass with a 
single mind." Capra presents the peasant class as 
industrious, but he also describes them as a "human machine 
producing rice and soldiers." 4 He also has empathy for 
teenaged girls whose parents sell them to brothels and 
factories in order to make a little money. 5 Although Capra 
sees the peasants as machines, but he implies that this is 
not the peasants' fault. The government designs education 
to teach children to think identically with one another; to 
do this, the government contracted teachers to "teach in 
the shortest possible time only the knowledge and skills 
necessary to make the student an obedient, loyal subject of 
the divine Emperor." Capra says that Japan had a "thought 
police" to keep people from thinking differently. This 
thought police arrests people for simply thinking 
dangerous, subversive thoughts about the government or the 




these thoughts. In the film, gangsters with automatic 
weapons represent this type of police. 6 
The Japanese ~fanaticalu devotion to their emperor is 
Capra's second reason why they are inferior to Americans. 
According to the documentary, all Japanese people worship 
Emperor Hirohito as the highest god. 7 In mythology, the 
sun-goddess, Amaterasu Omikami, became human, and her son 
became the first Emperor; 3 all following emperors are part 
of the sun and gods. 9 The narrator, Walter Huston, has a 
sarcastic tone when speaking of Japan's worship of 
Hirohito. Wherever the Emperor's flag leads, the soldier 
follows ~in a blind emotional rush." Since the Emperor is 
the chief god, "whatever takes place in Japan, it is he, 
the god-emperor, that causes it." The narrator continues, 
~From [the Emperor], all things emanate, and in him, all 
things subsist. He makes the Japanese rice grow, and he 
6 Ibid. 
7 After World War II, Hirohito denied his divinity; B.A. Robinson, 
"Brief History of Shinto." Religious Tolerance Organization. [article 
on-line]; available from http://www.reliaioustclerance.oro/shinto.htm; 
accessed 20 November 2004; Robert Sullivan, ed. "The Son of Heaven." 
Life Collector's Edition: Pearl Harbor: America's Call to Arms. 1 
(October, 2001): 26. 
8 Robinson, "Brief History of Shinto." 
9 The documentary continues with the Japanese idea that they all have a 
little bit of the sun in their blood. According to the mythology 
presented in Know Your Enemy: Japan, all emperors are true sons of the 
sun god. However, they marry human women. Over time, a little bit of 
the sun-god gets into every Japanese person. This is why they can join 
the gods after they die valiantly. However, only the emperor, who is a 
god while still alive, is the true son of the sun; Capra, Know Your 
Enemy: Japan. 
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makes Japanese soldiers conquer the world." 10 The 
documentary continues this idea that Emperor-worship drives 
Japanese soldiers to "conquer the world" and commit brutal 
acts in his name. The narrator intones, "In [the 
Emperor's] name, [Japanese] bring to other people justice, 
enlightenment, truth, and peace." Images shown during the 
narration oppose the narrator's conclusion; Capra uses 
footage of soldiers herding Chinese prisoners of war, dead 
and wounded civilians, starving people, and a dead baby 
lying in the street to show that Japanese actions 
overshadow their words and goals. 11 
Know Your Enemy: Japan shows Capra's belief that the 
Japanese are incredibly militaristic. Japanese leaders 
and citizens set out to follow Hakko Ichiu, the command of 
the first emperor, which states, "The Emperor of Japan is 
the emperor of all the races of the world." Therefore, 
Japan has to control all nations. When Japan opened to the 
West, the United States and other western nations brought 
industry, new forms of government, and Christianity to the 
closed nation, which Japan seemed to adopt, but it used 
these elements to develop its militarism and to obey the 
Hakko Ichiu. The nation used the Western industry, "not to 
10 Ibid. Emphasis retained. 
11 Ibid. 
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raise the standard of living, but to prepare for 
conquest. " 12 
In Japan, "to be a soldier is the highest human 
achievement." 13 According to Japanese mythology, to die in 
battle would make the soldier into a god. 14 The Samaria 
code, Bushido, emphasizes this mythology. Capra is 
presenting the reality of Japanese culture. Bushido is the 
code of the warrior. In Japanese culture, money should not 
influence true warriors, but loyalty to superiors and 
personal honor should be the motivating factors. 15 Capra 
uses this code to make the Japanese seem incapable of human 
emotion. In one section of the documentary, mothers lay 
urns that contain ashes of their dead soldier sons at the 
foot of a shrine to the Japanese warrior god, but Capra 
argues that peasant mothers do not grieve when their sons 
die in battle. Rather, the women rejoice that their sons 
are now gods. "6 
Capra did not understand the Japanese national 




15 "Bushido.u Encyclopedia.com. [encyclopedia article on-line); 
available from ht~://www.encyclopedia.com/html/bl/bushido.asp; 
accessed 7 April 2005. 
16 Capra, Know Your Enemy: Japan. 
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for a nice, quaint people." 17 Shinto involves various gods, 
the chief of which is the sun-goddess and ghosts of dead 
ancestors. Exceptional people, such as emperors, become 
gods. 18 However, the director continues that "there [is] a 
diabolical joker in Shintoism .... The state has forced 
into the teachings of Shinto a mad, fanatical doctrine; a 
doctrine that has brought suffering and death to untold 
millions. ,:g 
The director sees the Japanese as incredibly violent. 
Contrary to their belief that one of their ancestors is the 
sun-goddess, Capra says that Japanese ancestors were cruel 
barbarians, and the people have not evolved from their 
barbarous nature. Opposing Japan's expansion "brought 
suffering and death to untold millions of innocent [Asians] 
and now to thousands upon thousands of Americans." The 
narrator, Walter Huston, says, "Treachery, brutality, rape, 
and torture are all justified in use against non-
Japanese. " 20 
Capra also sees the Japanese as deceitful. He 
continues his image of Japan as the dagger that he 
introduced in Why We Fight: The Battle of China. Once 
17 Ibid. 
18 Capra, Know Your Enemy: Japan. See also Robinson, "Brief History of 
Shinto." 
19 Capra, Know Your Enemy: Japan. 
20 Ibid. 
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more, the dagger with the Rising Sun symbol, which 
represents betrayal, slams into opposing countries, such as 
China, India, Australia, and the United States. He also 
argues that the national pastime of Judo and the Samurai 
code, Bushido, expand this traitor image. Capra defines as 
"the art of giving in, making [the] opponent lose his 
balance, then tripping, choking, hit, chop, poke or kick 
(the] vital spots." This definition depicts Judo as 
treacherous and deceitful because Japanese will do anything 
to defeat their opponents, even by tricking their opponents 
into believing that the Japanese are defeated. When 
referring to the peace negotiations between Japanese 
Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu and Secretary of State 
Cordell Hull, Capra theorizes that Japanese diplomats 
"think in terms of Judo." The Samuria code, Bushido, is 
"the art of treachery and the double cross." 21 Capra thinks 
that Bushido influenced Japanese military, as the Samurai 
transformed into military leaders. 22 
Finally, Capra's documentary presents Japanese as sub-
human. He calls the Japanese population "machines." An 
animation that Capra uses in Know Your Enemy: Japan 
compares the population to an octopus. The animation shows 




a dagger-wielding octopus, which represents Japan. This 
octopus stabs other countries, including the United 
States. 23 
Generally, Nazi Germany did not receive the same kind 
of negativity from Capra. In both of his documentary 
series, he argues that the Germans were not essentially 
evil but mislead by a fanatical dictator. In none of his 
documentaries that depict Nazi Germany does he mention the 
Holocaust; Capra did not know the full extent of the 
Holocaust at the time of producing his documentaries. 24 His 
focus is on the expansion of Germany. However, in Capra's 
documentaries, there is little difference between the 
Japanese people, the Japanese military leaders, and the 
Japanese government. 
In Know Your Enemy: Japan, Capra presents a 
contradictory view of the Japanese civilians. On one hand, 
Capra feels sorry for the peasant class and angry that the 
government misled its citizens. However, he argues that 
the Japanese civilians perpetuate the government's abuse by 
believing in the Japanese culture and religion. Capra 
23 Ibid. 
24 Capra completed the Why We Fight series and Know Your Enemy: Japan 
before the full extent of the Holocaust was publicly known. Although 
Know Your Enemy was released after Nazi Germany fell, it was in the 
works since 1942. It went through several revisions because the War 
Department did not like any portrayal of the Japanese "as ordinary 
human victimized by their leaders." Dower, War Without Mercy, 19. 
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believes that culture and religion result in two 
conflicting conclusions for the Japanese peasants. The 
first conclusion is that Japanese believe they are better 
than every non-Japanese person is, and therefore, Japan 
should be the most powerful nation, no matter the cost. 
The second conclusion is that the Japanese Emperor and 
military leaders are gods or demigods, and therefore, above 




John Ford's World War II films and Frank Capra's World 
War II films represent several important things to film 
historians. The first thing historians should consider 
when regarding these films is whether the films are 
documentaries or whether they are propaganda films. The 
difference between the two types of films is that 
documentary films tell some historical facts, while 
propaganda films, although historically relevant, are 
overshadowed by their message. The second thing is how the 
films reflect the climate of the time and place in which 
they were produced. 
Some World War II non-fiction films that should be 
classified as propaganda fall under the genre of 
documentaries. There are some unique differences between 
true documentaries and propaganda films. In documentaries, 
the audience views a filmmaker's vision of the world. The 
filmmaker uses real events to encourage audiences to 
consider the director's vision of the world as the correct 
one. Propaganda films force audiences to accept the 
director's vision of the world. Propaganda films, and 
documentary films to an extent, incorporate fictional 
elements to present an official message. 
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Sometimes non-fiction films can blur the line between 
documentaries and propaganda. True documentaries can 
contain elements of propaganda. I viewed Battle of Midway 
and the Why We Fight series as pure documentaries. 
However, both directors use ingenious artificial techniques 
(narration and animation) to emphasize and support their 
real footage. These artificial techniques help to 
encourage audiences to make up their own minds on the 
subject. It is just as easy to see propaganda masquerading 
as documentaries. December 7th and Know Your Enemy: Japan 
are true propaganda films. Throughout most of the films, 
they use staged, misunderstood scenes and outrageous 
cliches to present their political message: the war is 
necessary in order to defeat a villainous people. 
These World War II documentaries reflect the 
filmmakers' visions, as much as any fictional feature film 
does. They also reflect and capture the intended time and 
place. John Ford and Frank Capra did not simply release 
all the film footage they shot. They designed the story and 
edited it down so the films reflect their own standards and 
their government's official messages. Although 
documentaries depict reality, the directors, and the 
government they serve, have an agenda they wish to convey. 
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It is interesting to note that both John Ford and 
Frank Capra's early World War II films fell under the 
documentary category while their later films should be 
classified as propaganda. They altered their techniques 
and perceptions to include the official political message 
regarding the Japanese. The official message presents not 
merely a negative view of the enemy, but a racist view of 
Japan. It is not evident if Ford and Capra believed their 
own propaganda, but anti-Japanese sentiment in the United 
States continued after the war was over, partly due to 
documentaries. The impact is that some people today who 
lived through World War II still refuse to have anything to 
do with Japanese. 1 
This shift of perceptions in World War II films also 
contribute to the post-War toleration of Japan. These 
propaganda films proved to be inaccurate after Japan's 
defeat. The Japanese citizens were not subhuman or 
monsters as the propaganda films depicted. Instead, Japan 
was a defeated nation, dependent on the United States for 
protection and aid. 
Documentaries also reflect the climate of the country 
in which documentaries were produced. World War II 
1 "Tara, 
Channel. 
Tara, Tara: The Real Story of Pearl Harbor." History 
Original Airdate: November 28, 2000, Video Cassette, 2004. 
58 
documentaries are terrific depictions of the general 
American ideals, such as loyalty, patriotism, and a need to 
defeat the enemy, especially those films made during the 
1940s. 2 Historians can figure out what Americans believe 
and what morality they prefer. 
Ford and Capra had messages to relate to Americans in 
their films. These were meant to argue the American view 
of the world. They are also supposed to convince a 
skeptical nation that fighting the Axis Powers, 
particularly Japan, would preserve American democracy and 
freedom. Finally, these particular documentaries show that 
the Japanese were suspect and dangerous to Americans. 
Historians do not view documentaries to gain 
information about the enemy. The Japanese depicted in the 
films are stereotypes, influenced by years of racist 
imagery. Instead, historians view documentaries to get an 
insight to the American moral mindset, something that can 
be overlooked in written documents about the war. 
John Ford and Frank Capra did not want to explore 
Japanese society and culture as if they were ethnographers; 
rather, the directors wanted to keep American morale and 
commitment to the war effort high. These films showed 
American mentality during the Second World War. Americans 
2 Ironically, those are also Japanese ideals. 
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saw the Japanese as immoral, different, and subhuman, and 
Americans thought that they had the power of "civilization" 
behind their war effort. The United States's ideals of 
race, religion, culture were evident throughout the films. 
After the war ended and the animosity between the 
United States and Japan dissolved, these images and 
documentaries remain as testimonies to the racial prejudice 
experienced by Americans. Although the racism and 
prejudice experienced by Americans were deep-seated and not 
easily forgotten, the racism slowly faded. In the post-War 
era, the two former enemies reached an understanding and 
joined forces to fight the new enemy: the Soviet Union. 
Japan was an ally against the United States's new foe: 
communism. The previous animosity between the United 
States and Japan virtually ended. 
John Ford and Frank Capra filtered their documentaries 
through their Western perspective; in their eyes, which the 
films represent, Japan was an enemy to the United States, 
as was Germany and Italy. Although Japan was the United 
States's wartime enemy, the two directors wanted Americans 
to know that Japanese were different in all possible ways. 
Japan was America's cultural and racial enemy, not simply 
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